Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games: Theory, by Frank Thuijsman, Florian Wagener

By Frank Thuijsman, Florian Wagener

This contributed quantity considers fresh advances in dynamic video games and their functions, according to shows given on the sixteenth Symposium of the foreign Society of Dynamic video games, held July 9-12, 2014, in Amsterdam. Written by means of specialists of their respective disciplines, those papers hide a number of features of dynamic online game conception together with differential video games, evolutionary video games, and stochastic video games. They speak about theoretical advancements, algorithmic equipment, matters when it comes to lack of know-how, and functions in components akin to organic or in your price range pageant, balance in conversation networks, and upkeep judgements in an electrical energy industry, simply to identify a few.
Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games provides cutting-edge study in a large spectrum of parts. As such, it serves as a testomony to the power and development of the sector of dynamic video games and their purposes. will probably be of curiosity to an interdisciplinary viewers of researchers, practitioners, and complicated graduate students.

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Extra info for Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games: Theory, Applications, and Numerical Methods (Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games)

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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first problem to be studied in optimal control of queues, going back to the seminal paper of Naor (1969). Naor considered an M/M/1 queue, in which a controller has to decide whether arrivals should enter a queue or not. The objective was to minimize a cost with the form of a weighted difference between the average expected waiting time of those that enter, and the acceptance rate of customers. The strategy that minimizes the above cost was shown to be of a threshold type where arrivals are accepted as long as the queue size does not exceed some threshold L and are otherwise denied access.

References Basar T, Olsder GJ (1982) Dynamic noncooperative game theory. Academic, London Berkovitz LD (1964) A variational approach to differential games. In: Dresher M, Shapley LS, Tucker AW (eds) Advances in game theory. Annals of mathematics studies, vol 52. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 127–174 Dutkevich YG, Petrosyan LA (1972) Games with a “life-line”. The case of l-capture. SIAM J Control 10(1):40–47 Fleming WH (1961) The convergence problem for differential games. J Math Anal Appl 3:102– 116 Haurie A (1976) A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solutions.

18) t0 / is time-consistent. x0 ; T t0 / in various classes of games. 1 Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 23 In the remainder of this section, we discuss the new concept of strong timeconsistency, and we define time-consistent solutions for cooperative games with terminal payoffs. t/; ˇ/ is the vector of total payoffs to the players up to time t. t/; T t/ that fail to satisfy this equation. t/; T t/ provides a “good” continuation of the original agreement. x0 ; T t0 /; is satisfied. By slightly strengthening this requirement, we obtain the concept of strong timeconsistency.

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